The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Washington Supreme Court recently held that the
public trust doctrine "has always existed in the State of Washington."1 This observation is difficult to accept uncritically,
however, after the scores of court decisions over the years that,
while implicating public trust values, have virtually ignored
the doctrine's existence. What makes the observation in
Caminiti v. Boyle particularly vexing is that the Washington
courts have consistently been reluctant to asume an active role
in protecting and promoting public access to the sea and its
wealth. In a state whose citizens place a premium on the quality of their natural surroundings, it is a curious phenomenon
that the Washington courts have failed to promote shorelines
and aquatic lands conservation within the established realm of
the public trust doctrine.
A survey of the resource places the issues in perspective.
Washington has 2,337 miles of marine coastline2 adjoining 15
3 approximately
counties,
40 cities of significant size, and more
than 200 islands. Geographic features framing Washington's
coastal region vary widely: precipitous, 500 foot rocky bluffs
* Associate, Pirtle, Morisset, Schlosser & Ayer, Seattle, Washington; B.A., Juniata
College, 1978; J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law, 1982; LL.M., University of
Washington, 1986.
1. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669-70, 732 P.2d 989, 944-95 (1987).
2. It is customary to preface a discussion of traditional public trust theory with a
brief definition of the terms that will be used to describe geographically distinct land
and water features. The land area lying between ordinary high tide and extreme low
tide in "marine" or tidal water areas will be termed "tidelands," and the area located
between the lines of ordinary high and extreme low water areas along a navigable
body of fresh water, "shorelands." Land located below extreme low tide and extreme
low water in any navigable water body will be denominated "submerged" lands, or the
beds of navigable waters. For an understanding of the jurisdictional boundaries
established pursuant to Washington's Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA) and
Aquatic Lands Act of 1982 (ALA), see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.030, 79.90.010-.050
(1986).
3. Clallam, Grays Harbor, Island, Jefferson, King, Kitsap, Mason, Pacific, Pierce,
San Juan, Skagit, Snohomish, Thurston, Wahkiakum, and Whatcom Counties.
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rim portions of Puget Sound,4 while the state's Pacific Coastal
Dune Area, extends to 7,000 feet in width. Broad reaches of
the Washington coast form one leg of the western flyway and
constitute a rookery for numerous species of migratory and
resident water fowl. The 50 mile Pacific Ocean Strip of the
Olympic National Park, created by executive order of President Theodore Roosevelt, constitutes one of the few remaining
stretches of wilderness beach in the continental United States.
Other Washington coastal localities noted for their unique
ecology include the shallow estuarine systems of the Chehalis,
Skagit, Snohomish, and Nisqually Rivers, whose intertidal
marshes provide nursing areas for juvenile marine finfish,
shellfish, water fowl, and other animals; and the Hood Canal,
whose glacially-carved fjord-like estuary is widely recognized
for its natural beauty.5
In the past two decades, residents of the state have witnessed a dramatic increase in competition for the use of Washington's coastal regions. For example, less than twenty percent
of the tidelands of Hood Canal are owned by the state and
available for public use. The shorelines of this environmentally sensitive embayment are owned in large part by private
residential homeowners, the federal government, two native
Indian tribes, and numerous commercial business entities. Continued economic growth along Hood Canal will ultimately fuel
an increase in coastal development, raising the specter of continued inter-tidal fill and the destruction of vital estuarine
habitat systems.
Together with their value as natural habitat systems, tidelands and uplands along Puget Sound also provide an attractive
location for residential and water-related commercial and
industrial development. The character and intensity of uses
4. The Puget Sound region includes the north (main basin from Admiralty Inlet
to the Tacoma Narrows) and south (extending from the Tacoma Narrows southward)
subregions, the Hood Canal, the waterways east of Whidbey Island, the San Juan
Islands, and the Juan de Fuca, Georgia, Haro, and Rosario Straits. For a thorough
discussion of the many interest and user groups vying for the marine resources of
Puget Sound, see Bish, Warren, Weschler, Crutchfield, Harrison, Coastal Resource Use:
Decisions on Puget Sound, 14-18 (Washington Sea Grant Program 1975) (hereinafter
cited as Bish).
5. See Washington Department of Ecology, Washington Coastal Zone
Management Program 5 (June, 1976) (describing the state's "areas of particular
concern" under the SMA). See also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.030(e), .202(1-7), .090(2)
(1986) ("shorelines of statewide significance" in the Washington Shoreline
Management Act of 1971, infra notes 106-125, and accompanying text).
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vary within and among the different regions. The urbanization
and industrialization that characterize the shorelines of Seattle, Tacoma, and Everett appear to a lesser degree in the
smaller communities located along Puget Sound. Some coastal
areas, notably those surrounding Hood Canal and Whidbey and
Camano Islands, are devoted in significant part to private residential uses. Other coastal areas, like those surrounding the
islands of the San Juan archipelago, are largely sport, recreation, and wilderness oriented.
The relatively quiet Puget Sound waters provide convenient terminal locations for commercial shipping, a major use
component of Washington's coastal zone. World class shipping
companies maintain home ports in Seattle and Tacoma. State
ferry terminals as well as private marine transportation systems exist throughout Puget Sound's main basin. Oil refineries located on Puget Sound serve the petroleum transfer
corridor located in the state's northern marine waters. Numerous marinas serve the moorage and other needs of recreational
boaters and are found throughout the navigable waters of the
state. Ship construction and repair facilities occupy the coasts
of Washington's major fishing and shipping communities, notably Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, Port Townsend, Anacortes, and
Bellingham.
What the foregoing serves to illustrate is that Washington's coastal zone is unique and beautiful, immeasurably valuable in terms of its diversity of ecological, residential,
commercial, and industrial uses. It is well documented that
the virtually infinite variety of uses of Washington's coastal
area has been the source of conflict.6 User conflict is manifested, for example, when environmentalists oppose the construction of a proposed Puget Sound oil refinery;' when
recreational fishing and boating enthusiasts trespass upon their
landed neighbors' private tidelands; and when hydropower
dam and water storage projects drastically curtail (or in some
6. See, e.g., Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission, Puget Sound Task Force,
Puget Sound and Acacent Waters (1970), a multi-volume study of the water-related
land uses, water recreation, water quality, power, fish, wildlife, and other resources of
the Puget Sound region, cited in Bish, supra note 4, at 14; see also R. BISH, GOVERNING
PUGET SOUND (Washington Sea Grant Program 1982) (hereinafter GOVERNING PUGET
SOUND).

7. One such proposal was by Atlantic-Richfield Company to place a refinery in the
area around Kayak Point, located on Port Susan Bay in Snohomish County. See J.T.
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); see also Bish,
supra note 4, at 121-27.
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cases virtually destroy) natural propagation of wild salmon or
steelhead stocks in aboriginal river systems.' In the face of
these and other conflicts, the management of Washington's
Puget Sound and Pacific Coastal regions presents an intricate
study in resource allocation.
The concept and practice of resource allocation presupposes the existence of certain individual and group rights as
well as priorities of use. An owner of tidelands claims a private entitlement to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of
his property. A free citizenry claims a collective bundle of
rights to swim in the sea, to walk its beaches and to wade for
crabs and dig for clams. A purchaser of commercially valuable
tidelands claims the right to use his property for log storage to
the exclusion of his formerly riparian neighbor. From what
legal authority are these "rights" derived? What is their genesis, and what, if any, is the scope of any such bundle of rights?
Where one set of perceived rights comes in conflict with
another, whose rights are accorded priority, and on what basis
are such decisions properly made?
This Article addresses these questions, first, by presenting
a brief description of the historical and legal foundation of
coastal resource allocation in the United States: the "public
trust doctrine." Second, a survey of the Washington experience demonstrates, surprisingly, that a state whose 2,337 miles
of marine coastline approximately equals the length of the
entire remaining coastline of the contiguous western United
States,9 has managed to establish a viable and responsive regulatory regime governing coastal resource use with scarcely a
mention in its laws of the "public trust doctrine."'
The question to be explored here is this: with the public
trust doctrine so firmly entrenched in the natural resource law
8. See generally, B. BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD
SALMON, Chapter 6 (1982). The controversy over impacts of hydropower development

on this state's fishery habitat areas has caught the attention of Congress, which in 1980
passed the Northwest Power Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980), (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 839). The Act calls on the Northwest Power Planning Council to, inter
alia, develop and revise the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. At this
writing, the Council has issued a draft amendment to the program on which public
comments are currently being solicited. See Northwest Power Planning Council,
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program 1986 Draft Amendment Document
(Sept. 1, 1986).
9. Bish, supra note 4, at 9.
10. See generally GOVERNING PUGET SOUND supra note 6. The author posits that
Washington's interjurisdictional coastal management system facilitates public access,
promoting a regime of "governance" that exhibits both flexibility and responsiveness.
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of many other jurisdictions, most notably California," why is it
that Washington's generally well-respected 12 coastal environmental policy evolved outside the legal realm of the public
trust doctrine? In Caminitiv. Boyle, the Washington Supreme
Court announced that the doctrine has always existed in this
state.'3 Despite the observations in Caminiti, however, can the

doctrine exist in the absence of active judicial participation in
natural resource conservation practice?
This article assesses the historical treatment of coastal
resource user friction in Washington and analyzes the relationship between the state's present legal regime and conventional
public trust theory.' 4 In this survey of the Washington experience, coastal and aquatic conservation legislation is explored.
The central question is whether the public trust - originally a
11. Early California cases demonstrate strong judicial support for modern public
trust theory in coastal resources law. See infra notes 84 & 86 and accompanying text.
In fact, the Washington Supreme Court has cited California law in cases involving
significant public trust issues. See Orion Corp. v. State of Wash., 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693
P.2d 76 (1985); Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915). Both of these decisions
are discussed infra.
12. Washington was the first state whose coastal zone management plan (CZMP)
was federally approved under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451-64 (1982)). There
exists a general consensus, however, that the Washington CZMP affords inadequate
protection to upland watershed areas, a critical habitat zone for anadromous fish and,
in terms of ecosystem management, a vitally important part of Washington's coastal
zone. See Washington State Department of Ecology, Adjacent Lands Guidance, (Oct.
1982), discussed in R. Hildreth and R. Johnson, CZM in California, Oregon, and
Washington, 25 NAT. RES. J. 103, 128-129 (Jan. 1985).
13. See supra note 1. Caminiti is discussed in greater detail at inkfra note 164 and
accompanying text.
14. Before proceeding any further it should be noted what this analysis will not
attempt. Outside the scope of this paper are public trust issues in the use of the state's
tidelands lying within or in front of incorporated cities. These are "harbor areas,"
designated as such by the Harbor Line Commission pursuant to constitutional and
legislative authority. See WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (conferring authority on the state
to locate and establish inner and outer harbor lines within or in front of cities, and
forever reserving harbor areas so designated to landings, wharfs, streets, and other
conveniences of navigation and commerce); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.90.010-.020 (1986).
Further, no analysis is undertaken here with respect to what public trust issues may
exist within the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations or federal enclaves within
Washington state. While there are significant public trust issues to be discussed in
these contexts, the questions raised concerning state law jurisdiction over lands lying
within Indian reservations and federal public lands and enclaves involve issues
generally beyond the limited scope of this paper. The public trust in harbor areas is a
matter extensively and ably considered elsewhere in the literature. See R. Johnson
and E. Cooney, HarborAreas and the Public Trust in Washington Navigable Waters,
54 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979). To the extent these coastal areas are considered here in
discussing public trust theory generally, the reader is advised to refer elsewhere for a
more thorough analysis.
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judicial doctrine - survives now as merely an anachronistic
adjunct to a comprehensive package of natural resources legislation. The conclusion here is that it does not.
Rather, this Article suggests that the public trust doctrine
exists in contemporary natural resources law for the same reason that it was spawned as a judge-made doctrine in this country in the 19th century: to promote maximum resource
utilization over time and to provide a baseline level of protection to fundamental natural rights of access to the sea and its
resources. Under the public trust doctrine, the role of the judiciary in the allocation and utilization of coastal resources historically has been to provide checks and balances protection
from wasteful or ill-considered legislative conveyances and
commitments of trust property. Any dedication of public
coastal resources to private (or less public) uses is considered a
delegation of the trust responsibility for which the public trust
doctrine provides a judicially-recognized floor. Where the public interest is diffuse or otherwise under-represented in the
allocation of coastal resources, the doctrine offers the Washington courts strong historical support for requiring a compelling
justification for legislative or agency-level decision-making in
derogation of the public trust.
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE GENERALLY

A.

Genesis

The public trust doctrine is neither new nor universal in
acceptance or application. Simply stated, the doctrine at common law is a recognition of the sovereign right of the individual states to protect inviolable public entitlements in certain
natural resources associated with the coastal environment.
Implicit in the doctrine is the fundamental notion that a state
may not alienate to private entities the totality of a recognized
and highly regarded public interest in certain resource commons. Both the geographic reach and the scope of interests
protected under the public trust doctrine have varied substantially among the states whose courts, legislatures, or constitutions have adopted it. Thus, it should be noted preliminarily
that any sweeping definitions that purport to encompass the
whole of the American doctrine should be viewed as suspect.
The origins of the public trust doctrine have been often
and ably described in literature and need not be thoroughly
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reviewed here."5 What is important to recognize from the outset, however, is that the American version of the doctrine finds
its roots in English common law through the writings of
Bracton,' 6 Blackstone, 7 and others declaring the shores of the
sea to be inalienable, the "common property of all."'"
In England, the King was assigned not only sovereign
dominion over the sea and the arms of the sea, but a vested
property right in its soil and subsoil as well. 9 Thus, he owned
the sea and its bed in a dual capacity: as proprietor and as
trustee for the public. The interest in the soil owned by him in
his proprietary capacity was termed the jus privatum and was
as freely alienable as any other property interest held by the
King. The interest in the soil over which he exercised mere
dominion, on the other hand, was held by the King in trust for
15. Contemporary public trust commentators have described the origin of the
doctrine in some detail. See Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes
Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970) for a thorough development
of the doctrine from early Roman times, through the English common law, to the
present. Some early legal theorists saw the English common law of the seashore as a
contorted but nonetheless logical extension of the Institutes of Justinian, viewed by
some to be an accurate memorialization of the civil law of ancient Rome. For the
views of one ardent public trust proponent, see J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT
OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 19, 31 (2d ed.
1847) (hereinafter ANGELL ON TIDEWATERS). Others, however, ascribe historical
legitimacy neither to Justinian's Institutes (claiming them to be the law reviews of
yesteryear), nor to the works of Bracton, whose concept of a common right of the
public on the seashore "has been supposed to prove too much." Blundell v. Catterall,
106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K. B. 1821) (opinion of Best, J.). In addition to the foregoing, see
generally, T. Digges, Arguments Proving The Queen Majesties Propertye in the SeaLands, and Salt Shores Thereof, and That No Subject Can Lawfully Hold Any Part
Thereof But By The Kings Especially Grante, reprinted in S. Moore, HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE 180-211 (3rd ed., 1888), and cited in Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 634 n. 14 (March 1986) (hereinafter cited as Lazarus); 2
H. BRACTON, OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S.Thorne trans. 1968);
W. BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 33-34 (4th ed. 1876);
JUSTINIAN INSTITUTES 1, 2.2., 2.3, 2.10 (J. B. Moyle trans. 4th ed. 1889).
16. See Bracton supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. "And truly by natural right, there be common to all; the air, running water,
and the sea, and hence the shores of the sea. Nobody is, therefore, prohibited to come
to the sea shore." JUSTINIAN INSTITUTES, supra note 15, at 2.1.1.
19. ANGELL ON TIDEWATERS, supra note 15, at 20. This distinction represents the
primary conceptual footing underlying public trust theory at common law - the dual
property system. Considered in greater detail below, the English common law version
of the dual property system recognizes that everything capable of occupancy and
susceptible of ownership must be assigned a proprietor. Those things incapable of
being exclusively owned and enjoyed, the "commons," were placed with the King on
the principle that not only is he the "universal occupant," but the "foundation from
whence, in contemplation of law, all authority and privilege proceed." Id. at 19-20.
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the public's use: the jus publicum. The King's proprietorship
interest and his trusteeship interest each embodied a concept
of property "rights" in the sovereign distinct from, and to some
degree repugnant to, the other. Yet the same resource commons, the sea and seabed about which Bracton and others
wrote, were simultaneously burdened with the rights and limitations inherent in each component of this "dual property" system: the jus privatum and the jus publicum.
Early on, questions arose among English common law
scholars concerning the scope of the doctrine and the geographic reach of this dual property concept. Regarding this
question of scope, the doctrine at early English common law2 0
was fashioned to accommodate only certain public uses-navigation and fishery-the prevailing source of trade and wealth
in England at that time. 2 ' These valuable yet incorporeal
rights of navigation and fishery (and their corollary, commerce) were deemed paramount to any assertion of a private
interest in the trust res. This triumvirate of public trust
uses 22 -fishery, navigation and commerce-survived intact
upon the American courts' adoption of public trust theory.
Vestiges of this historically narrow scope remain today.2 3
20. For a discussion of the modern scope of the doctrine in Washington, see infra
note 120 and accompanying text.
21. This is quite obviously a simplification of the roots of public trust theory. For
an excellent and very readable discussion of the development of the common law,
feudal England, protected trust uses, and the rights and duties of riparians, the
sovereign and other users of the sea shore, see ANGELL ON TIDEWATERS, supra note 15,
at 19, 31.
22. An historical curiosity should be mentioned here concerning the restrictive
manner in which the courts have interpreted "public" use claims for which protection
has been sought under the public trust umbrella. A 19th century case from the King's
Bench is often cited for the proposition that bathing and swimming are not considered
among traditional common law public trust uses of the sea shore: Blundell v.
Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821). In that trespass case, the defendant argued in
favor of a common law right in all of the King's subjects to bathe on the sea shore and
to pass over the dry sand area for that purpose. The court disagreed, and
acknowledging the existence of a custom of bathing in certain coastal localities, it
nonetheless decided broadly that no such "right" existed at all. The case is criticized
as having no foundation in logic for distinguishing between the general custom of
fishing (custom being at the root of the common law) and the local custom of bathing,
where each custom cannot be considered anything but equally "general" among the
same class of persons - the coastal inhabitants. See R. HALL, AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT, IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE

REALM (1830); cf. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C.DAvIS L. REV. 185, 189-90 (1980).
23. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 33 Cal.3d 419, 658
P.2d 709, 723-24, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360 (1983).
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The geographic reach of the doctrine was similarly a
source of controversy at early English common law. 24 Because
the doctrine historically has been interpreted as having its sole
application in the realm of navigable tidal waters and the soil
and subsoil beneath them, questions have revolved for centuries around the issue of a water body's navigability. 25 These
issues, too, have importance beyond their historical significance.2 6
Nonetheless, it is history that provides the true perspective on the evolution of public trust theory from its ancient
Roman origins to the present. Secession from England by the
colonies left seemingly endless stretches of American coastline
to the disposal of Congress, and it soon became apparent to
America's new proprietors that its navigable waters, submerged lands, and tidelands were altogether different in character and expanse from those found across the Atlantic.
Together with the novel questions raised by popular sovereignty and federalism, these factors serve to illustrate that the
public trust doctrine would require extensive judicial retooling
before any principled application in the United States.
B.

The Public Trust Doctrine in America.

With its decision in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois2

the

United States Supreme Court wove the first threads of public
trust theory into the fabric of American natural resources law.
At issue in this seminal public trust case were a series of state
legislative acts granting to the Illinois Central Railroad virtually the entire harbor of the City of Chicago. Under charges of
corruption, a subsequent legislature repealed the grants, and
the railroad company brought an action to quiet title.
The issue in Illinois Central was the power of the Illinois
legislature to alienate into private hands the whole of its inter24. For a discussion of the geographic reach of contemporary public trust theory
in Washington, see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
25. ANGELL ON TIDEWATERS, supra note 15, at 80.

26. Law review articles are legion on the concept of navigability and its
relationship to the public trust, the federal navigational servitude, water law and
related takings and other issues. In their casebook, Professors Hildreth and Johnson
neatly define the various navigability concepts as they arise in different legal contexts.
See R. HILDRETH & R. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 26 n. 4 (1983) [hereinafter
HILDRETH & JOHNSON]. For a general discussion on the subject of navigability as it
presently finds application to shoreline ownership, see Corker, Where Does the Beach
Begin, and to What Extent is This a Federal Question, 42 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1966).

27. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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est in the lakebed adjacent to the shores of Chicago's harbor
area. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the State of
Michigan held title to the bed of Lake Michigan pursuant to
the same sovereign authority by which a state holds title to
tide waters and tidelands under the common law of the seashore-the public trust doctrine.2" The lands so burdened
were held by the state in trust for its people and for the purpose of promoting traditional trust uses: fishing, navigation and
commerce. These interests subsumed a trust that the Court
labeled inalienable by the legislature, except, importantly, "as
to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining."29
Thus, the adoption of public trust theory into American
property and coastal law was as abrupt as it was complete.
With some important variations the public trust doctrine
adopted in Illinois Central essentially mirrored the prevailing
English common law theory." But this cornerstone of public
28. A more complete analysis of the means by which each of the original thirteen
states acquired title to the tidelands and beds of navigable waters within their
respective borders, and the placing of all subsequent states on an "equal footing" with
the former thirteen, requires a discussion which, while not outside the scope of this
paper, is amply available in public trust literature. See ANGELL ON TIDEWATERS, Supra
note 15, at 36, 53 (discussing Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)
and Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)). See also HILDRETH &
JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 23-24; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
29. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 453.
30. Under English common law, the sea and all lands flowed over by waters
subject to tidal influences, from the line of high tide seaward to the limits of national
jurisdiction, "were prima facie publici juris, or cloaked with a public interest."
Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1201 (K.B. 1821) (Holroyd, J.); see also the
discussion of the "cannonball rule" in Note, Righ Title, and Interest in the Territorial
Sea: Federal and State Claims in the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 463
(1974) (cited in HILDRETH & JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 171). While custom may have
been found to override the jus publicum, a presumption existed that tidelands and the
beds of navigable waters were subject to the public trust. An appropriation for general
public use of the King's land lying below the line of low tide was not ipso facto a
public nuisance, but to the extent it did in fact constitute an obstruction to navigation
not even the King could license it. Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1201. On the other hand,
in Illinois Central the Court rejected as inapplicable to the conditions of navigable
waters in this country the English admiralty rule limiting to salt-water cases the
assertion of domination and sovereignty over "navigable" waters. The doctrine was
originally founded upon the utility of preserving from private encroachment valuable
public rights in navigable waters, and the reasoning supporting the continued viability
of this principle applied equally to navigable fresh water as to water influenced by the
tides. Moreover, in apparent contradiction to the rule in Blundell, the court in Illinois
Central expressly left open the question, to be firmly decided later, whether a state
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trust law in the United States was soon to be expanded and
shaped to meet the often conflicting uses of the nation's shore
areas.
In Appleby v. New York, 3 ' for example, the Court held
that the state could in fact convey the jus publicum if the legislature clearly decided that an alienation of trust land to private exclusive use was in the public interest. Signalling a
possible doctrinal retreat from the non-delegation thrust of
Illinois Central, the court ruled that the power of the state to
part with property underlying navigable waters was governed
by the law of that state. That law, the Court observed, could
be derived from statutes and decisions in force when the proprietary grant was made. 32 This being so, and the will of the
people of New York being ostensibly reflected in the laws of
that state, a conveyance of the jus publicum-together with
the proprietary interest, the jus privatum-would be upheld
when to do so would be in keeping with the prevailing public
interest. 3
After Appleby, the authority of a state to make tideland
grants for reclamation, harbor improvement, and industrial
expansion was deemed paramount to what rights an amorphous public had in navigation and a free fishery. Except with
respect to the courts' recognition of an overriding federal interest in shore zone areas 34 or a state constitutional constraint
clearly delineating prohibited uses,3 5 it was not until the
could abdicate

its responsibility

over

the

navigable

waters within

its

borders

completely free of the public trust. See Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926); see
also infra note 31 and accompanying text.

31. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
32. Id. at 380.
33. Id. at 393-95, 399-400.
34. One such interest was that of the federal government in determining the
extent and validity of property rights owned or conveyed by the United States. See

Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967); Borax Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935); Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906). Another federal concern was for
the scope of Indian rights on reservation land. See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.
1963). For an early recognition of the federal navigation servitude in favor of the
United States over a state's interest in its navigable waters, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 89 (1824); Morris, The FederalNavigation Servitude: Impediment to
the Development of the Waterfront, 45 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 189 (1970). While not

decided on the basis of any perceived violation of the public trust, these sources do
illustrate federal primacy over the coastal states' power of disposition over tidelands

within their respective borders.
35. Examples of state constitutional provisions incorporating public trust values
include: CAL. CONST. art. X, §§ 3, 4; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27;

VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3; WASH. CONST. art. XV.
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advent of offshore oil production that the public trust doctrine
was revived as a judicial tool to encourage responsible legislative action restraining the improvident use of the nation's
coastal resources.
C. From 1970 To The Present:A Renewed JudicialActivism
A major oil spill in 1969 off the coast of Santa Barbara,
California provided an impetus for a renewed, vigorous judicial
activism in the regulation of competing uses in the coastal
zone."6 The late 1960's witnessed a groundswell of pressure for
legislative reform designed to alleviate the lack of representation by environmental and other public interest groups in
agency-level decision-making that directly affected the quality
of life in the coastal environment.
One proposal was offered to supplant this traditional mode
of low-participation, low-visibility administrative decisionmaking. In his influential article on modern public land law
and the public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph P. Sax advocated a heightened level of judicial activism."7 He argued that
traditional agency decision-making could be made more
responsive to the popular will through a new and broadlybased application of public trust theory, thus serving to
democratize and legitimize the process-function which previously was lacking in coastal and aquatic resource decision-making." The present administrative practice regulating public
lands and resources could be validated, according to Professor
36. See generally HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution 1969, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 2, 3, 4 (1969) cited in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 497 n.76
(1970). Testimony before that congressional subcommittee revealed that the
Department of the Interior opted not to hold public hearings prior to the issuance of a
permit to allow offshore oil development along the California coast. The resulting
pollution disaster led to a reexamination of administrative processes which denied
valuable procedural due process rights to interested individuals, most notably those
directly impacted by the spill. Administrative rule-making and adjudicative procedures
such as those increasingly relied upon by the U.S. Department of the Interior served to
alleviate congestion in the courts and, simultaneously, to delegate complicated and
highly technical natural resource allocation and production issues to agencies best
suited to decide them. Traditionally, the courts observed on review that agencies
presumptively acted "in the public interest," often refusing to second guess the
outcome of an agency decision. The result was an exclusion of an interested and
affected public from the decision-making process, and issues of denial of process rights
became instantly visible upon the event of the Santa Barbara oil spill.
37. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
38. Id. at 491-556.
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Sax, only when the agency whose constituent resource is
examined is forced to demonstrate the level of expertise it
claims to possess. Otherwise, goes the argument, the courts are
justified in refusing to blindly accept agency decisions as an
appropriate exercise of discretion.3 9 The role of the judiciary,
under the Sax model, is to more closely scrutinize "perfunctory and essentially predetermined public hearings '4' by either
requiring the intervention of an agency more representative of
the public interest in the controversy, or by calling upon the
legislature to make an express and clear policy determination
on the matter at issue.4 1
The Sax thesis argues that public trust theory offers a viable means of democratizing an essentially lopsided process in
which one interest is afforded greater representation in, and
access to, the legislature or administrative agency, while the
often diffuse competing interests tend to be under-represented
in the political process.' Having surveyed the experiences of
California, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and other states in applying the public trust doctrine to public land management issues,
Sax posited that public trust theory provides the courts with a
principled mechanism for promoting a wide consideration of
all public interests by requiring that decisions be made by a
body with a constituency sufficiently broad to be responsive to
the whole range of significant potential trust land uses.4 3
When these factors demonstrate a clear justification for
requiring enhanced accountability, the next step is to affirmatively examine which problems require judicial attention.
According to Sax, representative imbalance in the decisionmaking process is evidence of political diffusion, and the latter
indicates a weak organizational and financial base. Under
these circumstances, no presumption of full and complete consideration of all competing public trust uses is accorded the
agency determination. By removing the administrative leverage favoring preliminary agency determinations, the leveling
process is begun. The courts should then search for basic substantive fairness in the allocation decision and in the process of
44
decision as well.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id at 518.
Id. at 558.
Id
Id. at 560.
Id. at 560-61.
Professor Sax listed the following indicia to which the courts had looked to
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Viewed in this modern context, the public trust doctrine
encourages the courts to scrutinize legislative and agency decision-making, both in terms of process and substantive fairness.
It operates to validate-not undermine-the broader functions
of agency practice by assuring in the appropriate case that decisions are explained, justified, and rationalized. In his 1970
work, Professor Sax examined the relatively obscure public
trust decisions of a handful of states, extracted common fibers
of reason and analysis, and ultimately provided his readers a
calculus for extrapolating the doctrine's previously modest
application to a broad variety of issues in public land use law.
Public trust theory enjoyed a period of overwhelming
acceptance and doctrinal enlargement during the 1970's. 5
While in many states its traditional scope still exists to some
degree, the public trust doctrine is now barely recognizable
solely in terms of its original function-the protection of commerce, navigation, and fisheries. The geographic limitations of
its English common law heritage, too, are all but gone. The
doctrine has been invoked with varying degrees of success in
attempts to press for "public trust" review of the dry sand
areas of a beach,4 6 of an historic battlefield, 47 and of an alley
adjoining a junk yard.48 One innovative proponent of the public trust would attempt to invoke a public interest in art.' 9
On the other hand, the heightened standard of protection
under modern public trust theory has often been rejected in a
number of situations in which it has been invoked. The public
trust doctrine witnessed a slight ideological decline in the
1980's; it has been described as anachronistic and having no
place in the context of contemporary natural resource property
theory.5 ° Some currently view the doctrine as an obstacle to a
find evidence of unfair resource use allocations: (a) whether the property has been
disposed of at less than market value; (b) whether the government has granted
resource use decision-making authority to an entity more likely to subordinate the

general public interest to private interests; (c) whether diffuse public uses have been
reallocated to private (or less broadly public) uses; and (d) whether a resource is being
used for its natural function. Id. at 562-565.

45. For an exhaustive collection of public trust literature and case law published
since 1970, see Lazarus, supra note 15, at nn. 69-83.
46. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978).
47. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,

Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 203, 311 A.2d 588, 595-96 (1973) (Roberts, J., concurring).
48. Mamolella v. First Bank of Oak Park, 97 Ill. App. 3d 579, 423 N.E.2d 204
(1981).
49. Comment, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121 (1981).
50. See citations in Lazarus, supra note 15, at n. 396.
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comprehensive theory of natural resources law."' One author
has argued against its application in the water law allocation
model,5 2 and even the United States Supreme Court recently
evidenced a modest retreat from applying traditional public
trust theory in certain narrow circumstances.5 3
Under the prevailing and better view, however, the public
trust doctrine is a valuable tool to enhance public participation
in natural resource allocation practice at the administrative
level and clearly has evolved from a property-oriented doctrine
to a process-oriented one. Widespread judicial acceptance of
the Sax theory has moved legislatures and state natural
resource agencies toward an enhanced public involvement and
accountability in natural resource decisionmaking.
With this understanding of the evolution of public trust
theory from its origins in Roman civil law and the English
common law into its post-Revolutionary American version, and
having observed both the renaissance of the public trust doctrine after acceptance of the Sax model by the American judiciary in the early 1970's, and the modest decline of the doctrine
in the 1980's, our focus again turns to the Washington
experience.
III.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON.

Given the settled principle under Illinois Central that the
lands beneath the navigable waters of a state are owned by it
upon statehood and held in trust for its people, the issue is
this: what significance can be drawn from the historical
absence of the public trust doctrine from Washington's constitutional, legislative, and, before Caminiti,54 decisional law?
A.

The DelegationPreference: Early Tidelands Disposition
in Washington.
One early case decided two years following Washington's
admission to statehood supports the view that the state had
early recognized its public trust responsibilities without specifi51. See generally idt
52. Trelease, Governmental Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV.
638 (1957).
53. See Summa Corp. v. Cal., 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (holding that while doctrine is
still valid, no public trust easement exists where private grantees' predecessors-ininterest had their interests confirmed in a federal patent proceeding under federal
statute implementing an international treaty).
54. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987).
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cally adopting the public trust mantle. 55 One year before Illinois Central 6 was decided by the United States Supreme
Court, the Washington Supreme Court in Eisenbach v.
Hatfield undertook to define the nature and extent of riparian
rights in the tidelands abutting Puget Sound. A textbook case
of tidelands use conflict, the Eisenbach court held that, under
Articles 15 and 17 of the Washington Constitution, "riparian
proprietors on the shore of the navigable waters of the state
have no special or peculiar rights therein as an incident to
'5 7
their estate.
The Eisenbach decision clearly accepted the basic precepts
of public trust theory. The court first discussed the powers of
the sovereign as they were derived from English common law
and adopted into American public land law through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 8 Central to
Eisenbach was the notion that the state had the power, derived
through constitutional provisions and legislative enactments, to
regulate tideland use in derogation of privately-held expectations, when that regulation was determined to be in the public
interest. According to the Washington Supreme Court, the
authority of the state to convey the jus privatum 9 in its tidelands cannot be abridged without injury to its "powers of selfdevelopment. ' 60 Thus, in Eisenbach, the power of the state to
preserve its tidelands for the "public right of navigation and
fishing" 61 was clearly preserved (curiously, however, through
the power to make a private tidelands grant). But the court
declined to specifically invoke the public trust doctrine to
ensure protection of public rights in and over Washington's
tidelands.6 2
55. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891).
56. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), discussed in the text
accompanying note 28, supra.

57. Eisenbach, 2 Wash. at 253, 26 P. at 543-44.
58. The court cited Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), and
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). These cases were chiefly relied
upon by the United States Supreme Court in its later decision, Illinois Central. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
59. Chief Justice Anders did specifically recognize that common law was the rule
of decision in the absence of legislative authority, and while he did address the 'Jus
privatum" of the English common law, curiously no reference is made to its symbiotic
twin, the 'Jus publicum." Eisenbach, 2 Wash. at 240, 26 P. at 540.
60. Id. at 253, 26 P. at 544.
61. Id. at 240, 26 P. at 540.
62. Not so with the dissent of Justice Stiles, however. He argued with vigor that
the state owns no submerged lands in a proprietary capacity but merely as a sovereign,
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Twenty two years later, in an action to quiet title to land
uncovered by the receding waters of Lake Washington resulting from the construction of a ship canal connecting it to Lake

Union and Puget Sound,6 3 the issue raised was whether the
"right jus publicum" 64 could be asserted by the state against
riparian owners who claimed an ownership right in the
exposed shorelands. A freshwater controversy, State v. Sturtevant stands as one of the few early Washington cases in which
explicit trust language can be found in the text of the decision.
Discussing the right of a riparian to extend his ownership of

second class shorelands to the line of navigability,6 5 the court
observed: "The only right which the state has ever undertaken

to maintain in trust for the whole people is the right of navigation."6 Writing for the court on rehearing en banc, Justice

Chadwick subsequently declined an invitation to rule on the
"right jus publicum" of the state until an appropriate opportunity was presented. 7 Clearly, however, the tenor of the deci-

sion favored privately held rights in tidelands.

After State v. Sturtevant, therefore, the question remained
unanswered: whether the "right jus publicum" in the state's
citizens to a free fishery would be afforded similar protection

under decisional law, when that right came in conflict with the
a pointed and telling distinction and one not drawn by the majority. Rather than bow
to bald assertions of state "ownership" of tidelands, Justice Stiles ably argued that the
state merely holds these lands as trustee for its people as an incident of sovereignty.
Sovereign power alone confers no authority to divest its citizens (including a riparian
owner) of their common right of access to fish in the sea by making an outright grant
of the soil. Id at 272-74 (Stiles, J., dissenting). Is there not some irony in the
observation that, while the right of exclusive possession was sought by both the
defendant (tidelands grantee) and the plaintiff (riparian proprietor) in their respective
claims of superior title, each party defended his private claim in part on the ground
that a contrary ruling would circumscribe a valuable public right-the right of public
access! Id at 267 (Stiles, J., dissenting).
63. State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
64. I& at 180.
65. "Second-class shorelands" were defined at the time to include "lands
bordering on the shores of navigable rivers and lakes below the line of ordinary high
water and not subject to tidal flow." RAM. & BAL. CODE § 6641 (Laws of 1897, p.2 3 0
§ 4). Today the statutory definition of shorelands includes such lands waterward to
the line of navigability. See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.045 (Supp. 1986).
66. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. at 165, 135 P. at 1037. This would appear at odds with the
suggestion to the contrary implicit in Eisenbach, 2 Wash. at 240 26 P. at 540
("navigation and fishing").
67. 76 Wash. at 180, 135 P. at 1037. From Sturtevant, therefore, the proposition is
established that, in 1913, Washington recognized one of the two traditionally protected
public entitlements under then prevailing public trust theory-the public right of
navigation.
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right of a private tidelands owner to the peaceful and exclusive
enjoyment of his property. As might be expected, much of the
law concerning public fishing rights in the shore area would
turn on the question of private fee ownership of tidelands.
Two related cases reaffirmed that the state acquired upon
statehood a fee interest in its tidelands: Grays Harbor Boom
Co. v. Lownsdale68 and Lownsdale v. Grays HarborBoom Co.69
Acknowledging the argument for a mere sovereign trusteeship
in the state's tidelands, instead of a proprietary fee interest in
the property vesting upon statehood, the Washington Supreme
Court stated in its per curiam opinion in Grays HarborBoom
Co.:
While it would be interesting, it would not be profitable, nor
is it possible within the scope of this opinion, to trace the
conflicting theories whether the King (the public) originally
held title to the shore and tide lands in fee, or subject to the
riparian or littoral rights of the upland owner.7 °
One month later, analyzing the provisions of Article 17,
Section 1 of the Washington Constitution,7 1 the court in
Lownsdale described the nature of state ownership of tidelands
as "a reservation of a title in fee, carrying with it all of the
attributes of such a title. '72 To recognize riparian rights in
abutting shoreline owners, thus restricting the power of the
state to dispose of its tidelands in the manner provided by statute, would
be to make public and practically destroy property of untold
value that has been, up to this time, supposed to be susceptible of private ownership; in fact such a rule would open to
the commons all of the immense bodies of tide and shore
to individuals and which
lands which the state has conveyed
73
is now held as private property.
68. Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 102 P. 1041, reh'g denied,
104 P. 267 (1909).
69. Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542, 103 P. 833 (1909).
70. Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. at 98, 104 P. at 269.
71. Article XVII provides in relevant part:
The State of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all
navigable waters up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters
where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary
high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes ....
WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
72. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. at 549, 103 P. at 836.
73. Id. at 551, 103 P. at 837.
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It should be emphasized that these two later cases arose in
the context of riparian rights and did not directly involve
issues of public trusteeship per se. However, what the cases do
reflect is a strong policy preference formulated early in Washington's history favoring private ownership rights, reclamation,
and commercial and industrial development along the shores
of Washington's navigable waters. The Washington Supreme
Court reaffirmed its view that the state possessed an unqualified fee ownership in lands beneath its navigable waters. Riparian rights, strongly protected elsewhere in the country, were
extinguished in Washington in favor of a full power of tidelands disposition devolving upon the legislature upon statehood. While the Washington court recognized its obligation to
maintain navigable waters open for the public right of navigation, early decisions reflected a judicial antipathy toward this
obscure and ill-defined legal obstacle to what then was among
the most desirable shore zone uses - development and industrialization. At the expense of riparian proprietorship, the
public trust vindicated the state's power to assure clear title to
the private property interests of its development-oriented tidelands grantees.
This policy preference favoring private property holdings
in tidelands became more apparent in the controversy over a
grant in fee of second class tidelands bordering Kitsap County
in Puget Sound pursuant to the provisions of an act relating to
the purchase and sale of oyster lands. 4 In Palmer v. Peterson,
an action to restrain a trespass and to award damages was
brought by a tidelands grantee seeking to prevent the defendant and his employees from entering upon or passing over the
tidelands in question, "either upon foot or by boat, or other
water craft . . . . 5 In a terse three-page opinion, the court
observed that the grant in question was absolute in form, carrying with it the right to exclusive possession and enjoyment.
The court, quoting Illinois Central, held that the incidents of
ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over the lands
beneath a state's navigable waters entitled the state to make
such conveyances to the extent the same could be accomplished without "substantial impairment of the interest of the
public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right
74. Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909).
75. Id at 75, 105 P. at 180. The tidelands were covered to a depth of 7 or 8 feet at
high tide. Id at 76, 105 P. at 180.

652

University of Puget Sound Law Review

of Congress to control their navigation ...

[Vol. 10:633

."76 Following a

cursory survey of Washington case law, the court summarily

concluded:
The conveyance by the state of tide lands covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the tide is not a substantial
impairment of the interest of the public in the navigable
waters of the state, and does not interfere with the paramount right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states. [Citations omitted]
Judgment affirmed.7 7
What the Washington Supreme Court accomplished in Palmer
v. Peterson is both illuminating and confusing. Relying on Illinois Central, the court clearly held that the acts of the legislature in granting certain tidelands into private hands
extinguished any public right of navigation and fishery in the
waters flowing over those lands. Confusing, however, was the
court's failure to scrutinize the legislation enacted in derogation of the public trust, considering that a hard judicial inquiry
was the theoretical cornerstone of the case cited in support of
its decision-Illinois Central. With no mention of the extent
of the grant in question or the location of the remaining tidelands to which the defendant (or the public) might have a similarly convenient right of salt water access, the trespass and
damages award were affirmed. Read closely, the holding
would seem to sanction a tacit "several" (private) fishery incidental to any tidelands grant by the state into private hands.
At a high tide depth of seven or eight feet, the waters over
plaintiff's tidelands would appear quite capable of supporting
most forms of (circa 1909) commercial and recreational navigation; however, as to the defendants, at least, even that right
The public trust was not a
was summarily extinguished.
in 1909.
Washington
of
law
favored doctrine in the
7
Six years later in Hill v. Newell, " the court considered a
dispute involving the proposed construction of a bulkhead
along the Duwan-sh River to divert the natural stream into a
channel cut for the purpose of straightening the waterway.
Appellants, abutting property owners to the natural meander
of the Duwamish River, sought to enjoin the respondent
76. Id. at 76, 105 P. at 180; see also Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash.
542, 103 P. 833 (1909); Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891).
77. Palmer, 56 Wash. at 76-77, 105 P. at 79.

78. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
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municipal waterway district from completing the rechannelization project, which would result in the gradual accumulation of
sediment and silt and the ultimate filling of the original
riverbed; in effect, it would cause an abandonment of the public's navigation interest in that original portion of the Duwamish River. The "real question," according to the court, was
"whether the title to the abandoned bed is in appellants
or the
'79
waterway district.

Citing section 1 of article 17 to the Washington Constitution, the court first reiterated its position that the state and not
a riparian proprietor owns the bed and shores of navigable
tidal waters to the line of ordinary high tide.80 Significantly, it
also quoted the general rule of statutory construction that a
grant of public lands from the state will not be enlarged by
construction and must be strictly construed against the

grantee.8 1
The court ruled that, under Shively v. Bowlby, 2 the state
was entitled to administer its own property laws when passing
on the extent of its own grant. Since Eisenbach3 taught that
riparian rights in Washington were extinguished at statehood
by constitutional fiat, the right of the state (i.e., the public) was

paramount in beds and tidelands beneath navigable tidal

waters. In recognition of the state's duty to administer these
lands in a manner consistent with the best interests of the public, the court relied on the reasoning of a lodestar decision in
California public trust law decided only two years previously,
People v. CaliforniaFish Co.'
79. Id at 228, 149 P. at 951.
80. Id at 229, 149 P. at 952.
81. "The general rule of construction applying to grants of public lands by a
sovereign to corporations or individuals is that the grant must be construed liberally as
to the grantor and strictly as to the grantee, and that nothing shall be taken to pass by
implication." Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. at 229, 144 P. at 452.
82. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
83. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891).
84. In People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913), the California
Supreme Court was faced with the decision whether to allow private ownership to
continue at the expense of public rights in tidal lands granted by the state into private
hands. Utilizing a theory of public trust derived from Illinois Central, the California
court found a solid middle ground upon which to decide whether a public easement for
navigation and fishing had been extinguished in favor of a private tidelands grantee.
Paraphrasing, the reasoning and decision of the court can be characterized as follows:
(1) tidelands are and have always been dedicated to the public use for navigation and
fishery; (2) title to these lands is in the state, held in trust for the people, and the trust
is to be administered by the legislature; (3) the powers of the state as trustee are not
expressed but implied, to be exercised commensurate with the duties necessary to the
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Quoting the relevant passages from California Fish, 5 the
Hill v. Newell court expressly adopted the underpinnings of
then-contemporary public trust theory in California.8 Having
done so, however, the Supreme Court curiously proceeded to
decide Hill v. Newell with absolutely no inquiry whether the
legislation empowering the waterway district to undertake the
rechannelization effort evidenced a "clearly expressed or necessarily implied" legislative intention to abandon the jus publicum in the original bed of the Duwamish River.
In Hill v. Newell, therefore, the Washington court relied
on a California case famous for its searching reason and thorough analysis of the public trust doctrine-a case ultimately
supporting the considered act of the California legislature in
abandoning its trust responsibilities in affected California tidelands. In practice, however, what the Washington court
adopted from California Fish was merely its result. As in
87 decided six years previously, the court in
Palmer v. Peterson,
Hill v. Newell eschewed an opportunity for a hard look at the
subject legislation, and as a consequence public rights in the
original bed of the Duwamish River water course were summarily extinguished."8
As these early cases demonstrate, the public trust doctrine
in Washington was a preservationist, even socialist, legal doctrine searching for application in an economically hostile environment.8 9 With proper assurances that full fee ownership of
execution and administration of the trust; (4) if necessary in the administration of its
trust responsibilities the state may extinguish the trust and irrevocably convey the
tidelands free of the trust easement; (5) statutes purporting to so extinguish the trust
will be scrutinized to determine whether such an intention is "clearly expressed or
necessarily implied"; (6) a clear indication of an intent to extinguish the public trust
will be given effect, but where no such intention appears, the court, where reasonably
possible, will interpret the statute in such a manner as not to involve a termination of
the jus publicum. Id., 138 P. at 87-88.
85. Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. at 231-32, 149 P. at 952-53.
86. For a discussion of California's continued adherence to public trust principles,
see Note, Increased Public Trust Protectionfor California's Tidelands - City of
Berkeley v. Super. Court, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 399 (1980).
87. 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909).
88. A closer look at the authorities cited in CaliforniaFish discloses that a case
strikingly similar to Palmer v. Peterson was decided quite dissimilarly in the
California courts. The California Supreme Court ruled that, in view of CAL. CONST.
art. XV, § 2 (1908) protecting the public right of navigation, a tidelands grantee may
not exclude boaters from passing over lands submerged at high tide absent an express
extinguishment of the public right of navigation. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127
P. 156 (1912). Compare, Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179; WASH. CONST.
arts. XV, § 1 and XVII, § 1.
89. For a fascinating history of the individuals and institutions responsible for
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tidelands included the right to exclude others, private holdings
in Washington's tidelands increased at the expense of a rapidly
diminishing public domain.' Development along Washington's
marine shorelines was a preferred, even encouraged practice
during the state's early commercial and economic expansion,
proceeding largely as a consequence of the burgeoning wood
products and fisheries industries.
One early example of the legislative reaction to the economic pressures inherent in natural resource exploitation was
the enactment in 1927 of the state's Public Lands Act.91
Designating (interalia) tidelands "belonging to or held in trust
by the state"9 2 as "public lands" under the 1927 Act, the legismuch of the early coastal development along Elliott and Port Gardner Bays in Puget
Sound, see M. MORGAN, SKID ROAD: AN INFORMAL PORTRAIT OF SEATTLE (1982); N.
CLARK, MILL TOWN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF EVERET=, WASHINGTON FROM ITS EARLIEST
BEGINNINGS ON THE SHORE OF PUGET SOUND TO THE TRAGIC AND INFAMOUS EVENT
KNOWN AS THE EVERT MASSACRE (1970).

90. A word should be mentioned here relative to the disposition of tidelands into
the hands of private grantees. The Washington legislature has declared certain Pacific
Ocean shores and beaches to be "public highway[s] forever, and as such highway[s]
shall remain forever open to the use of the public." See State v. Wright, 84 Wash. 2d
645, 646, 529 P.2d 453, 454 (1974) (quoting relevant but now superceded portions of
Washington's Pacific Ocean Beach Highways Laws: WASH. LAWS ch. 54, § 1; WASH.
LAWS ch. 105, § 1; WASH. LAWS ch. 110, § 1, formerly codified as WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 79.16.130, .160, .170 repealed by and amended by, 1982 WASH. LAWS 1st Ex. Sess., ch.
21, § 183, and currently codified as, and amended by WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.94.340.370 (1985)). Since 1901 these enactments have served to prevent the sale of
Washington's Pacific Coast beach area tidelands. By contrast, conveyancing of
tidelands in the Puget Sound region continued unimpeded until 1971. Generally,
under prior law an upland owner was accorded a preferential right to purchase
adjoining first-class tide or shorelands upon having first received notice of sale. WASH.
REV. CODE § 79.94.070 (1986).
The upland proprietor preference option was,
theoretically at least, considered to be bargained for by riparians in exchange for the
extinguishment of riparian rights in adjacent navigable water bodies. See State v.
Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913). Abutting proprietors to second class
shorelands were secured a similar preference right, but second class tide lands were
sold in the same manner as other state-owned public lands. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 79.94.090, .260 (1986). In 1971, the Washington legislature passed a law prohibiting
the further sale of Puget Sound tidelands by the state into private fee ownership.
WASH. REV. CODE

§ 79.94.150(2)

(1986).

Currently, much of Washington's Pacific

Ocean shore and beach areas are reserved from sale for public use. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 79.94.340-.360 (1986). Private individuals may only lease state-owned tidelands in
the Puget Sound region, and then only under the terms of Washington's new
comprehensive Aquatic Lands Act of 1982, WASH. REV. CODE

§§

79.90.010-.96.907

(1986). See infra notes 144-163 and accompanying text (discussion of the Aquatic
Lands Act).
91. 1927 WASH. LAWS ch. 255 (originally codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.04.010.090, based on 1897 WASH. LAWS ch. 89, and 1895 WASH. LAWS ch. 178; see also REM.
§ 7797-1 (re-codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.01.004-.900)).

REV. STAT.

92. WASH. REV. CODE

§

79.01.004 (1962).
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lature in effect recognized its sovereign responsibility to manage these lands as a valuable natural resource, held by the
State of Washington in trust for its citizens. In practice, however, the Act was little more than a comprehensive tidelands
and submerged lands disposition and leasing program. The
Washington Supreme Court had held that the recognized public policy of the state since its admission to statehood was to
encourage development of Washington's tidelands through the
grant of long-term tidelands leases." The Public Lands Act of
1927 was unquestionably the legislative embodiment of that
policy. 4
Outside the state's harbor areas, 9 5 prior to the mid-1960's,
Washington witnessed a legislative program excluding private
ownership of ocean beach tidelands and a Puget Sound tidelands leasing and disposition policy that tended to encourage
the virtually unrestrained private occupation and development
of what had become recognized as an invaluable public
resource commons, the coast. Historically, Washington's
marine coastline could accommodate the diversity of commercial shellfish cultivation, residential, commercial and industrial
development, recreation, and other traditional shoreline uses.
Although public navigation was an ostensibly protected right,96
this right was not generally perceived as threatened by the
exclusion of the boating or shipping public from passing over,
for example, private oyster lands. Tidelands, the Washington
93. Boyer v. State, 19 Wash. 2d 134, 142 P.2d 250 (1943).
94. Washington's 1927 Public Lands Act did include a provision requiring that any
lease of tidelands in an oyster reserve be subject to the possibility of reverter in the
state should the tidelands cease to be used for oyster cultivation. 1927 WASH. LAWS ch.
255, § 148 (originally codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 79.20.070; recodified as WASH. REV.
CODE § 79.20.588 (repealed 1982). Under the Bush (Oyster) Act of 1895, the sale of
tidelands in an oyster reserve created a similar possibility of reverter in the state. 1895
WASH. LAWS chs. 24, 25 (codified as REM. REV. STAT. § 8040 (repealed 1935); see also
Halversen v. Pacific County, 22 Wash. 2d 532, 156 P.2d 907 (1945). It could be argued
that the oyster lands use preference embodied in the sale and lease provisions cited
above was among the earliest legislative expressions of the public trust in tidelands
resources in Washington State - in effect, an early coastal resource management
policy. The "oyster lands" laws served the interests of both the Lockean oyster
cultivator (by allowing the opportunity for the fee or lease interest to continue in
perpetuity) and the "public" in its oyster fishery resource commons (by requiring the
sale or lease terms to include a possibility of reverter in the state). See, e.g., Wiegardt
v. State, 27 Wash. 2d 1, 175 P.2d 969 (1947). This dual property philosophy (property at
once both public and private) exemplified the property-based essence of common law
public trust theory.
95. See Johnson and Cooney, Harbo- Lines and the Public Trust in Washington
Navigable Waters, 54 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979); see also supra note 14.
96. See State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
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Supreme Court implied, were always abundantly available for
public access and use.97
B. Non-Delegation: The Lake Chelan Decision
Coastal development flourished in the first half of the
twentieth century in Washington. Prosperity fostered growth,
and the finite character of Washington's coastal environment
soon became obvious to those claiming a right to a piece of it.
Not until the state witnessed a large-scale population growth
in the post-war era did the friction between coastal user groups
become apparent. History will reflect that coastal environmental planning emerged in Washington as a direct result of one
seemingly innocuous footnote to the opinion of Justice Hill in
98
the landmark case of Wilbour v. Gallagher.
At issue in Wilbour v. Gallagherwas the right to fill privately-owned land covered and uncovered by the artificial raising and lowering of the waters of Lake Chelan, a large and
navigable fresh water lake located at the foot of the eastern
slope of Washington's Cascade range. Defendants, the Gallaghers, asserted a right to fill their privately-owned shorelands above the line of high water. Plaintiffs, the Wilbours
and others, brought a class action to have the Gallaghers' fill
removed and sought damages for the reduction in value of
their own properties. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs
were estopped from requiring the Gallaghers to remove the
fill, but awarded damages for the diminution in value of their
respective properties resulting from loss of view and, to a
lesser degree, from the inability of plaintiffs to use the water
over the filled lands for navigation, fishing, swimming, and
other purposes related to general recreation.9 9 Defendants
appealed, asserting a right to fill their land and claiming that
damages sustained by plaintiffs were "damnum absque
injuria"; plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguing that the completed
fills should have been abated by the trial court. 1°
The Wilbour decision opened a new chapter in Washington tide-and shorelands law. Significantly, the court declined
an invitation to decide the case on a theory of prescriptive
rights, but decided instead that the fills constituted an impedi97. See Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909).
98. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969).
99. Id at 312, 462 P.2d at 235.
100. Id
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ment to navigation and must therefore be removed. According
to Justice Hill, the defendant shoreland' 0 1 owners could exercise the rights of any private landholder while the land was not
submerged, and could do with the land as they wished "consis10 2
tent with the right of navigation when it is submerged.'
Accordingly, since at high water the fills constituted an
obstruction to public navigation, a protected public right, the
court required that the fills be removed.
Despite its straightforward reasoning, however, the court
was troubled by the time-honored practice surrounding Lake
Chelan of allowing similar fills to proceed unchallenged. In
footnote thirteen to Wilbour v. Gallagher,Justice Hill wrote:
There undoubtedly are places on the shore of the lake
where developments... would be desirable and appropriate.
This presents a problem for the interested public authorities
and perhaps could be solved by the establishment of harbor
lines within which certain fills could be made, together with
carefully planned zoning .

.

this state the lake's
possibilities .... 103

navigational

. to preserve for the people of

and

recreational

This brief but highly significant comment reintroduced
debate in Washington over the need for comprehensive shoreline planning. It left in its wake a controversy among legal
scholars and practitioners whether this newly-recognized public right in the waters over shorelands and tidelands jeopardized the time-hardened right of unrestricted private ownership
of non-public submersible lands. °4 Clearly expressed, how101. The opinion was not actually couched specifically in terms of shorelands
ownership, as the waters ebbed and flowed as a result of artificial fluctuations caused
by the raising and lowering of Lake Chelan for the purposes of hydroelectric power
generation. However, the court decided that, for all practical purposes, it was
unnecessary to recognize any legal distinction under the circumstances between
artificial and natural fluctuations in lake levels. The term "shoreland" is used here
for reasons of conceptual clarity.
102. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d at 316, 462 P.2d at 329.
103. Id. at 317 n.13, 462 P.2d at 239 n.13.
104. Professor Charles E. Corker advocated the position that the decision in
Wilbour v. Gallaghercast considerable doubt whether in the future private tidelands
or shorelands owners could fill in derogation of certain public rights of navigation and
recreation. See Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public
Permission-Washington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45 WASH. L. REV. 65 (1970).
Arguing "in the spirit of an advocate" for developers, Edward A. Rauscher advanced
the argument that the decision in Wilbour v. Gallagher should be limited in
application to its particular factual circumstances. See Rauscher, The Lake Chelan
Case - Another View, 45 WASH. L. REV. 523 (1970).
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ever, was a reaffirmation of the public right of navigation,
together with a newly recognized right of recreation on the
navigable waters of Washington and the necessity for comprehensive planning and management of the state's shorelines to
assure uniformity and consistency in shorelines land use decision-making. Though not burdened with the doctrinal baggage
of its traditional counterpart, the public trust in Washington's
shore areas was implicated in Wilbour v. Gallagher. Following
that decision, the onus fell squarely upon the legislature to
confront and address an impending coastal rights conflict
between the private owner and an increasingly aggressive public user interest.10 5
C. The Legislative Response: The Shoreline Management Act
of 1971
Coalesced in opposition to the potentially harsh repercussions of Wilbour v. Gallagher, coastal development interests,
title insurers, institutional lenders, local port authorities and
105. Recall the central premise of public trust theory - that the judiciary will
recognize the wholesale disposition of submerged and submersible lands only when an
intention to do so is clearly expressed or necessarily implied by legislative enactments,
taking into account the interest of the public in the waters remaining. The obvious
corollary of this rule can be stated: Without a clear statement of intent and an
adequate consideration of the public interest in the waters remaining, the judiciary
may restrain the flow of resource wealth from public into exclusively private hands.
In essence, footnote 13 says no more and no less - upon adequate consideration, but
not until, the legislature may alienate the jus publicum. Perhaps Wilbour v.
Gallagher can be read to embody the public trust doctrine in its purest sense-the
power in the courts derived from the common law to restrain the extinguishment of
public rights in resource commons, not creating or expanding upon the extent of
public rights but rather acting to protect existing ones in the absence of a clear
expression of legislative intent to the contrary. So interpreted, the public trust
underpinnings of Wilbour v. Gallagherdo not signal an unwarranted judicial intrusion
into the realm of considered legislative judgments, a common criticism of public trust
application generally. See Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law:
Ineffective - and Undesirable - Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOL. L.Q. 455 (1982);
Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: Public Rights,
State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 MAINE L. REV. 105 (1985). Given the
implicit policy statement in Wilbour v. Gallagher that public rights in the resource
commons will not be extinguished in the absence of an explicit legislative directive
(the "non-delegation" policy), remaining unanswered is the appropriate standard of
judicial review to be employed when examining wasteful or inefficient legislative or
administrative coastal or aquatic resource allocation decisions. It would seem that the
present differential standard of judicial review does not offer adequate protection of
the public trust. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721, 736, 592 P.2d
1108, 1117 (1979) (Shorelines Hearings Board decision that logging practices outside
"shoreline" areas cannot be regulated under the SMA must be given "considerable
weight.").
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the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) formed a
curious partnership in 1970 with Governor Evans and environmental groups in a joint effort to obtain legislative support for
a comprehensive shoreline-related environmental conservation
proposal. 1' 6 From legislative compromise and conciliation
emerged the Shoreline Management Act of 1971,07 a coastal
land use regulatory regime whose pronounced goal was stated
to be the prevention of the "inherent harm in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the state's shorelines."' '
A permit system was set in place under the SMA by which
local governments, whose approved "master programs"'1 9
frame the parameters for local regulation of shorelines, have
"primary responsibility for initiating and administering the
regulatory program of [the Act]."" And while local authorities have the primary regulatory authority over "shorelines of
the state" generally, certain other shore areas ("shorelines of
statewide significance") were felt to be sufficiently important
to the citizens of the state as a whole that the Washington
State Department of Ecology (DOE) was endowed with more
substantial planning authority to regulate land and water uses
in these vital shore areas."' The Act places a check on local
controls by providing a state-level override of local master program proposals which do not meet the preferential uses contemplated for "shorelines of statewide significance."
The Act also provides for shoreline master program jurisdiction over "wetlands"' 1 2 and "wetland areas,""' 3 certain wetlands "associated with"' 4 a body of water covered by the Act,
and all land located within 200 feet of the high water mark." 5
106. In fact, prior to the decision in Wilbour v. Gallagher, the Washington
Environmental Council and other environmental groups already had a shoreline
development initiative underway following the earlier defeat of a bill designed to
regulate shoreline development. For a thorough review of the events leading to the
enactment of the SMA, see Bish, supra note 4, at 153-175.
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.010-.930 (1985). For an early discussion and analysis
of the SMA, see Crooks, The Washington Shoreline ManagementAct of 1971, 49 WASH.

L. REV. 423 (1974).
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1985). Note that the term "shoreline" refers to

all water areas (salt- and freshwater) of the state, together with the lands underlying
them, with certain notable exceptions. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(c)-(e).
109. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.020, .030(3)(b) (1986).
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050 (1985).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.020, .030(2)(e) (1986).
Id., § 90.58.030(2)(f).
I&
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(e)(vi) (1986).
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(e)(4) (1986).
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Lands "adjacent" 116 to shorelines must also be considered in
shoreline master programs to achieve the systematic shoreline
management purposes of this comprehensive legislation.
Thus, in terms of its geographic reach, Washington's
Shoreline Management Act provides protection for a recognized' 17 public interest in lands completely submerged"" by
the waters 1 9 of the state, in submersible (i.e., shorelands and
tidelands) lands, in associated wetlands, and in some adjacent
upland areas. Consistent with the geographic reach of conventional public trust theory in the United States, the SMA
embodies a legislative attempt to compromise user conflict not
only at the land-water interface, but seaward to the boundaries
of state jurisdiction and landward to the reach of water influences, and even beyond.
A review of the scope of public interests afforded general
protection under the Act demonstrates as well its roots in public trust theory. Despite the time-worn declaration in State v.
Sturtevant that the "only right which the state has ever undertaken to maintain in trust for the whole people is the right of
navigation,"' 20 the SMA explicitly recognizes the interest of
the public in its enjoyment of the physical and aesthetic qualities of the natural shorelines of the state.''
Public access and water-relatedness are key policy objectives under the Act.'2 2 Where applicable, every shoreline
master program must include a series of "elements" implementing these broad policy objectives; these elements require
local officials to consider recreational, conservationist, historical, cultural, scientific, educational, and other values in shoreline planning.' 2 Exemptions are also provided; a close parallel
to conventional public trust theory is found in the SMA under
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.340 (1986). See also Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8
Wash. App. 844, 849, 509 P.2d 390, 394 (1973); Washington State Department of
Ecology, Adjacent Lands Guidance, (Oct. 1982) (discussed supra,note 12).
117. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1985). The legislative findings and policy
annunciation contained in this section make numerous references to the "public
interest" in the state's shorelines.
118. "'Shorelines' means all the water areas of the state ... together with the
lands underlying them .... WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(d) (1986).
119. Id. Note also that certain classifications of water areas are specifically
exempted from SMA regulation. Id.
120. State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 165, 135 P. 1035, 1037 (1913); see also supra
note 67 and accompanying text.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1986).
122. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.020, .100(2) (1986).
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 9 0.58.100(2)(g) (1985).
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the legislative declaration removing from the requirements of
the Act certain areas which, as a result of "alterations of the
natural conditions of the shoreline," no longer meet the definition of "shorelines of the state."' 2 4
As a consequence of the parallels that exist between conventional public trust theory and Washington's SMA, some
might argue that the call for heightened judicial scrutiny
under Professor Sax' public trust model is obviated. Under the
SMA, the Washington legislature provided a means for public
participation in the coastal use decision process and simultaneously instituted a mechanism for substantive resource conservation. Process obligations are imposed which require a pause
in the administrative shuffle to consider, explain, and justify
any proposed alienation of the jus publicum in Washington's
shore areas. Recall that the Sax model 2 ' advocates a heightened judicial scrutiny when management authority over public
trust lands is delegated into private or less public hands under
circumstances which fail to evidence a full, complete, and
unambiguous intention to consider and extinguish state trusteeship. Public participation in coastal decision-making is facilitated under the SMA where local officials are given the
authority to make coastal land use decisions. Local master program use elements favoring water-related uses along the shorelines of the state are the specifically stated policy of the
community and must be considered by these local officials in
approving or denying any proposed shoreline use. Substantive
environmental protection through wise resource conservation
is the ethic; the process-oriented local shoreline master program permit system and public hearing forum provide a means
for effective grassroots input in coastal land use decisionmaking.
It is fundamentally wrong, however, to suppose that the
role of the judiciary in coastal resource allocation has been
substantially diminished with the enactment of the SMA. To
assume that public trust protections are exclusively in the
hands of the legislature is to ignore the relativistic holdings of
124. "Properties that have been filled, whether or not they have been
substantially improved, are free of the trust to the extent the areas of such parcels are
not subject to tidal action." City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda, 26 Cal.3d
515, 534, 606 P.2d 362, 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 338 (1980) (discussed in Note, Increased
Public Trust Protection for California's Tidelands-City of Berkeley v. Super. Court,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 414 (1980).
125. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Illinois Central, Appleby, and California Fish. The principal
thrust of Illinois Central centered on the limitations of state
legislative power to make excessive delegations of public
resources to private or less public uses. Appleby is not to the
contrary; it confirms the principles in Illinois Central, and
then sharpens the inquiry by placing Illinois' excessive conveyances in perspective when the Court affirmed the power in the
New York legislature to make an explicit but narrow alienation of the jus publicum. Under circumstances evidencing a
full and balanced considertion of protected trust uses, a conveyance of certain trust lands may be justified when considered in relation to the public interest in the whole.
So viewed, the public trust doctrine confirms the relative
spheres of state judicial and legislative power. Under this theory, no single branch of state government is permitted an
exclusive hold on resource allocation practice. This concept is
no less applicable today, where the doctrine, as shaped by these
early cases, continues to provide guidance to all who participate in the coastal resource allocation process. The enactment
of a shorelines law may as a general proposition indicate a
rational and consensus-oriented state coastal resource allocation regime, but in the myriad situations involving individual,
value-based judgments under the SMA-particularly in shorelines administration at the local or county level-judicial
review must take place in an informed and responsible manner. The public trust doctrine not only contemplates continued
judicial scrutiny of public rights under Washington's SMA, but
demands it, and on a scale warranted under the unique circumstances surrounding each individual case.
D.

"Takings" and the Public Trust Doctrine: The Orion Case

One of the enduring aspects of public trust theory is its
relationship to the law of eminent domain and taking by excessive regulation. Grounded in constitutional law, takings claims
are often made by landowners whose property development
expectations are frustrated by state and local planning efforts
designed to mitigate shoreline land use conflicts by regulations
that seek to reconcile property development with natural
resource conservation.
Often in shoreline land use disputes, the question is not
whether the property is or is not adequately protected by environmental regulation.
Shoreline management is well

664

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 10:633

entrenched in the contemporary realm of land use law, and
there is little question now that states may simply legislate certain large scale shoreline development expectations out of
existence. A landowner cannot legitimately complain that his
expectations were unfairly frustrated by zoning restrictions in
place prior to his acquisition of development property. A separate matter, however, is the imposition by state or local planning authorities of zoning-type restrictions on property already
slated for development. The question, then, is whether the
state is required to compensate owners for lost development
opportunities in order to advance the legitimate objectives of
the public trust doctrine.
This was precisely the question raised in Orion Corp. v.
State,126 a classic controversy between private rights and public
trusteeship in Washington's shore zone. In the early 1960s, the
Orion Development Corporation ("Orion") began acquiring
property and options to purchase property adjacent to one of
the state's most ecologically diverse and productive marine
habitats: Padilla Bay, located in Skagit County on the coast of
Puget Sound. Orion acquired the property with a goal in mind.
The developers envisioned a dredge and fill operation in
Padilla Bay to allow for the construction of a residential, Venetian-style community, one supporting a planned local population of approximately 30,000 with retail, commercial and
recreational facilities. Before the developers' expectations
could be realized, however, Washington's Shoreline Management Act 1 27 became law in 1971.

The Skagit County Shoreline Management Master Program ("SCSMMP"), was approved by the Washington Department of Ecology on October 5, 1976.128 Under the SCSMMP, a
significant portion of Orion's property was designated an
aquatic area, destined only for such uses as would be compatible with the SCSMMP's applicable use categories. It is sufficient to say here that the County's "aquatic area" use
designation effectively precluded implementation of the type
of residential and commercial development Orion had previously planned.
At issue in Orion was whether the trial court correctly
126. 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985).
127. See supra notes 106-124 and accompanying text.
128. As is pointed out above, DOE approval of'local shoreline master programs
elevates them, under the SMA, to the status of a state-wide administrative regulation.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(1) (1985); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-16-040 (1985).
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denied a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants,
Skagit County, and the State of Washington. Defendants
argued that Orion had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, pointing out that not once had the developer even sought
to secure a substantial development permit from Skagit
County planners.'2 9 Plaintiff countered, pointing to a consistent pattern of permit denial by state and county planners of
Orion's (and others') development plans for Padilla Bay. It
argued an exception to the "exhaustion doctrine" recognized in
Washington: that no administrative appeal is required when to
do so would be futile under the circumstances.1 30
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed. Upon review of
the evidence, it was evident to the court that the state and
county' 3 ' had made a specific policy choice to prevent development of Padilla Bay. 1 32 Following enactment of the SMA and
the state's approval of the SCSMMP, Orion, despite its efforts,
had nevertheless been unable to arrive at a use plan acceptable
to state and county officials. Holding that a permit application
by Orion would have constituted a "vain and useless act, ' 13 3
the court remanded the cause to the lower court for a trial on
the merits.
The majority opinion in Orion was not rendered without
criticism. In his dissent, Justice Dore chastised the majority
for emasculating the administrative appeals procedure established by the legislature under the SMA. But in a cautiously
worded concurring opinion, Justice Utter provided the parties
with a vexing insight. "[P]roperty rights in privately owned
tidelands," he observed, "may not be identical to those in pri129. Orion, 103 Wash. 2d at 467, 693 P.2d at 1384 (Dore, J., dissenting).
130. See South Hollywood Hills Citizens Assn. v. King County, 101 Wash. 2d 68,

73-74, 677 P.2d 114 (1984) (citing Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975)).
131. The court relied in part on the fact that the Washington State Coastal Zone
Management Program (WSCZMP) labeled Padilla Bay an "area of particular concern."
Orion, 103 Wash. 2d at 448-49, 643 P.2d at 1374. While the WSCZMP itself imposed no
regulation on Padilla Bay, the court found this factor to be relevant to the state's
overall objective, addressed in the SMA, to "recognize and protect statewide interests
over local interest." WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020(1) (1981) (cited in Orion, 103 Wash.
2d at 449). Another factor in the balance was the establishment on August 29, 1980 of
the Padilla Bay National Estuarine Sanctuary. See 16 U.S.C. § 1461 (1986); 15 CFR 921
(1986) (discussed in Orion, at 103 Wash. 2d 453-54, 693 P.2d at 1376). On remand, the
trial court ruled that a taking had occurred not later than the date the Sanctuary was
established. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion Establishing Date of Taking Not Later
Than August 29, 1980, Orion, No. 82-2-00391-6 (Skagit Co. Sup. Ct. March 7, 1986).
132. Orion, 103 Wash. 2d at 460, 693 P.2d at 1380.
133. Id.
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vately owned uplands."' 3 4 A quotation in full is warranted:
Even prior to enactment of the Shoreline Management
Act of 1971, the extent to which Orion might have been able
to develop its tidelands property is unclear. Article 17 of the
Washington Constitution vests ownership of tidelands in the
subject
State. However, disposal of tidelands by the State is
135
to the public interest in navigation and the fishery.
Read in its historical context, this observation is highly significant in two primary respects. First, it reaffirmed the principle, virtually dormant since Hill v. Newell, 36 that the state's
Article 17 power to alienate tidelands into private ownership is
not an unlimited one.
But perhaps the most significant aspect of his concurring
opinion is that Justice Utter provided the parties with a
roadmap for further analysis of the taking issue. Acknowledging, as the parties did, that denial of Orion's tidelands development rights was a fait accompli, the concurring opinion
revived a proposition central to conventional public trust theory: that public access to Washington shorelines for navigation and the fishery is given a paramount status over the
state's otherwise unlimited power of disposition. On remand,
then, the question was whether Orion or its predecessors had
secured all the incidents of fee ownership when the state originally conveyed the lands in question. The trial court's task
was to examine the nature and extent of public and private
ownership of lands burdened with the public trust. If these
lands were in fact burdened with a public trust "easement" as
of the date of the original grant from the state, then no taking
could result from land use regulations designed to promote
public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishery. Under this
analysis, it may be argued that shoreline development is not a
is said to have reasonable
right upon which a tidelands owner
'13 7
expectations.
"investment-backed
While arguably unfair, non-deed restrictions concerning
proposed uses of private property are not unique to the public
134. Id&, 1093 Wash. 2d at 464, 693 P.2d at 1382. (Utter, J., concurring) (citing
Crooks, The Washington Shoreline ManagementAct of 1971,49 WASH. L. REV. 423, 456
(1974)).
135. Orion, 103 Wash. 2d at 464, 693 P.2d at 1382 (Utter, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).

136. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915) (discussed supra note 79).
137. See Penn Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 292 (1922). See also Kaiser-Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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trust arena. The cornerstone of any land title system is the
public notice function upon which property vendees rely for
assurance of title quality. But one need only refer to the string
of Supreme Court zoning cases in order to find support for the
constitutional validity of unrecorded restrictions on uses of private property. 138 Short of permanent physical occupation of
the property, land use regulation will not often be found to
constitute a taking for which compensation must be paid.' 39
In support of the public trust "easement" concept, it may
be said that the navigation servitude was reserved by the
United States under the Commerce Clause, such that the
states themselves, upon statehood, never actually received the
full incidents of fee ownership of the shore zone. 140 Or, perhaps the scope of the federal navigation servitude is not as
broad as that of the public trust easement, which the state may
be said to have reserved to itself.' 41 Whatever the approach,
the result is the same: the tidelands owner has fewer than the
full spectrum of rights typically associated with unrestricted
upland fee ownership.
On remand, the trial court in Orion partially adopted the
public trust rationale but managed to achieve the inevitable
accommodation. It ruled that a taking had occurred, but
adjusted Orion's measure of damages to reflect no reduction in
property value "resulting from the inability of plaintiffs to use
their tidelands in a manner which would substantially impair
42
public navigational rights.'

The trial court's accommodation of interests appears to
correctly apply the common law public trust doctrine to the
broadly regulated field of Washington shorelines law. It evidences compromise but without prioritization of competing
interests; public resources are conserved over time, while the
property owner is offered a fair and equitable measure of
relief. Orion thus presents a classic public-versus-private
rights clash, and the trial court's solution illustrates that com138. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
139. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 483-89
(2d ed.
1983).
140. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); see also supra note 28.
141. But see Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr.
401
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968) (recognizing a state navigation servitude
where
Congress has not seen fit to exercise the reserved federal navigation power).
142. Order on Public Trust Doctrine, Orion, No. 82-2-00391-6 (Skagit Co. Sup.
Ct.
March 7, 1986).
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mon law public trust principles offer a workable formula for
accommodating divergent interests in coastal and aquatic
resource allocation decision-making.
Another lesson of Orion is that a substantial advantage
may be won in the name of environmental protection where,
after a "hard look," the courts conclude that the public benefit
to be derived from trust-protective shoreline regulation should
not be effectively diluted by requiring the state to repurchase
the full fee value of broadly regulated tidelands. Whether a
"taking" occurs is a constitutional issue that the courts are
uniquely qualified to address, and, in this context, the judiciary's role in environmental protection is a critical one. Considerable authority exists for the proposition that a "taking"
should not result from the exercise of a navigational servitude.
The Orion case typifies the tidelands controversy in Puget
Sound, and presents the Washington courts with a unique perspective on shoreline management under the SMA. Whether
the Supreme Court will uphold a trial court's modified "rule of
no compensation"' 43 depends in large part upon a broader
acceptance of the Sax model, encouraging a renewed judicial
activism in the allocation of scarce public resources.
E.

Other Recent Trust-ProtectiveLegislation

The SMA is only one of many recent legislative enactments that have brought the light of public scrutiny to bear on
the management of traditionally protected public trust uses
and resources in Washington. Consider, for example, Washing4 4 The ALA is part
ton's Aquatic Lands Act of 1982 ("ALA").
of a comprehensive package of public lands legislation enacted
143. See, e.g., Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power
and Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATuRAL RESOURCES JOuRNAL 1, 2 (1963). See also
Comment, The Navigation Servitude as a Method of Ecological Protection,75 DICK. L.
REV. 256 (1970); Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle
for a Doctrine, 48 OR. L. REV. 1 (1968); Stoebuck, Condemnation of RiparianRights:
A Species of Taking Without Touching, 30 LA. L. REV. 394, 432-35 (1970).
144. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.90.010-.96.907 (1986)); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 79.24.580 (1986). The Aquatic Lands Act of 1982 was the first step taken to
comprehensively amend and compile the public land laws relating to Washington's
aquatic resources. The Act was subsequently amended in 1984 following sharp
legislative debate concerning the need for specificity and uniformity in the
establishment of aquatic land lease rates. See 1984 WASH. LAWS ch. 221. One provision
authorizing abutting landowners to maintain (free of charge) private recreational
docks on state-owned shorelands, tidelands and bedlands recently withstood
constitutional and public trust attack. See Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732
P.2d 989 (1987) (discussed infra note 166).
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in 1982 to allow more effective management of the state's
aquatic resources. 4 ' The Act contains many of the provisions
formerly scattered throughout the Code authorizing and defining the scope of state management authority over the state's
aquatic lands, consolidating them under a principled management program for the orderly administration of the state's
aquatic resource commons.
The Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
is delegated the authority to manage state-owned aquatic lands
"for the benefit of the public."' 4 6 These lands are recognized
by the legislature to constitute "a finite natural resource of
great value and an irreplaceable public heritage."' 4 7 A management philosophy is expressed in the Act directing DNR to
"provide a balance of public benefits for all
citizens of the
state."' 48 Indeed, DNR regulations go a step further, providing that the state's aquatic lands "are managed as a public
trust ....

"149

The Aquatic Lands Act promotes a decidedly conservationist objective in the management of the state's aquatic lands.
Public benefits to be derived from a considered management
policy include public use and access, the fostering of waterdependent uses, environmental protection, the utilization of
renewable resources, and, not surprisingly, the generation of
revenue in a manner consistent with the state's trust
145. "Aquatic lands" is a term originally defined in the 1982 ALA to
include "all
state-owned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable
waters."
WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.010 (1986). The 1984 ALA amendments, while
retaining the
above provision, added a new section defining "state-owned aquatic
lands" to mean
"those lands and waterways administered by the department of natural
resources or
managed . . . by a port district. 'State-owned aquatic lands' does not
include aquatic
lands owned in fee by, or withdrawn from the use of, state agencies
other than the
department of natural resources." WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.465(12)
(1986). Care
should be taken to distinguish between the alternative uses of these
phrases found
throughout the ALA.
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.450 (1986). Generally, DNR is responsible
for the
management of approximately 11 square miles of harbor area, 140
square miles of
shorelands, 205 square miles of tidelands, and the beds of all navigable
waters of the
state. The tidelands under DNR management have a frontage of approximately
1,300
miles. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332-30-100(1) (1983); see also
1 Department of
Natural Resources, Aquatic Lands Newsletter 1 (1983). For a brief
outline of the
history and use of DNR's aquatic lands, see id., (citing Washington
Department of
Natural Resources, Totem, (1982)).
147. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.450 (1986).
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.455 (1986).
149. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332-30-100(1) (1983); see also WASH. ADMIN.
CODE 33230-106(53) (1985) (defining "public trust").
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150

responsibility.
Included in the ALA are general provisions relating to the
151
provisions establishing
leasing of state-owned aquatic lands,
5 2
harbor areas,' 5 and waterways
easements and rights-of-way,
4
and streets5 on tide- and shorelands; provisions relating to
the preference for, and the classification, sale, and reservation
15 5
provisions relating to leases
of certain tide- and shorelands;
5 6 and for aquacultural uses;' 57
waters
of the beds of navigable
and, perhaps most importantly here, provisions relating to the
establishment of the Aquatic Lands Enhancement Account
(ALEA). 8
The ALEA is an account created by the legislature in 1984,
funded by 40% of the net revenues generated from the "sale or
59
The Act provides that:
lease of state-owned aquatic lands.'
After appropriation, these funds shall be used solely for
aquatic lands enhancement projects; further purchase,
improvement, or protection of aquatic lands for public purposes; for providing and improving access to such lands; and
.... 160
for volunteer cooperative fish and game projects
Net revenues generated from aquatic lands leases or sales
are directed to the capital purchase and development account
both the ALEA and CPDA are
(CPDA),' 6 ' and earnings on1 62
fund.
general
the
credited to
Just as tidelands and shorelands are regulated under the
SMA to minimize the spill-over effects of coastal user conflict
under the SMA, so are the state's publicly-held aquatic lands
subjected to the conservation-oriented public benefits and
"water-dependent" concepts of the ALA to minimize the
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.90.45 (1986). But see Carniniti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d
662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987) (upholding free use of state aquatic lands for recreational
docks by abutting waterfront property owners).
151. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.91.010-.902 (1986).
152. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.91.010-.900 (1986).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 1&
157. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.96.010-.907 (1986).
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.24.580 (1986).
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.24.580 (1986). Note the use of the term "state-owned
aquatic lands"; see also supra note 145.
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.24.580(1) (1986).
161. Or, alternatively, into the building bond redemption fund in the event certain
enumerated revenue bonds are issued. See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.24.580(25) (1986).
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.24.580(25) (1986).
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inherent friction in competition for the state's public aquatic
resources.
Public trust theory in its classical form recognizes that the
shore areas and the beds of navigable waters are to be held by
the state in trust for all its people. Recognizing the need for
efficiency in the orderly administration of the trust res, the
Washington legislature created a process under the ALA by
which the state's renewable aquatic resource commons is utilized (in theory, at least) to the benefit of all. Aquatic resource
productivity is maximized over time (a utilitarian concept)
while resource wealth remains open in common for this and
future generations (the absolutist mandate of the public trust
doctrine).1 6 3 Issues of delegation from public to private trust
lands management, the favorite "process" target of the public
trust doctrine, are not implicated where DNR maintains a
responsible grip on allocation practice. Thus, where substantive resource protection is maintained through conservation
practice, and where the public has not been divested of its
rights of management and control over, or access to Washington's aquatic lands, there would appear little justification in
the abstract for a judicial "hard look" at public trust protection
in aquatic lands management. As will become apparent below,
however, aquatic lands management in Washington does not
always deserve the level of judicial deference it commands.
F.

Confirmation and Repudiation: The Public Trust
DoctrineAfter CAMINITI V. BOYLE

Caminiti v. Boyle' 64 represents a milestone in public trust
law in Washington, marking the first occasion on which the
judicial public trust doctrine was first explicitly acknowledged
in this state. In Caminiti, a conservation-oriented shoreline
rights organization petitioned the Washington Supreme Court
seeking an original writ of mandamus directed to the state
Commissioner of Public Lands and State Treasurer. At issue
was the constitutionality of the Revised Code of Washington
Section 79.90.105, which authorizes shoreline owners to build
and maintain private recreational docks on public tidelands
and shorelands without compensation to the state. In Caminiti, having finally breathed life into the judicial public trust
163. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
164. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987).

§§ 2.16(b),

(c) (Supp. 1984).
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doctrine in Washington, 1 65 the court nevertheless refused to
invalidate the state's wholesale relinquishment of fee revenues
for the private use of public lands.
The statute challenged in Caminiti--one notorious among
shoreline interest circles in Washington'"-was attacked on
two fronts. First, petitioners sought to invalidate the statute
on the theory that a free private use of public lands constitutes
an unconstitutional gift of property. 16 7 Second, petitioners
urged the court to explicitly adopt the public trust doctrine,
and to employ it as a measure of judicial control over excessively generous delegations of public resources into private
hands.
The court responded predictably. Over the lone dissenting
opinion of Justice Dore, who agreed that the statute authorized
an unconstitutional gift of public property, the majority in
Caminiti perpetuated 168 the curious notion in Washington that
a fundamental right of shoreline public access is facilitated by
allowing waterfront property owners the free and exclusive
use of state tidelands and shorelands. As it had done in the
past, 1 69 the court once again ironically institutionalized the
flow of public resource wealth into private hands. Reciting
regulatory controls under the SMA,' 70 the court suggested that
public interests in the jus publicum are promoted by the chal171
lenged statute, "albeit to a limited degree."'
The failure of the Caminiti analysis lies in the court's
refusal to scrutinize the history of the recreational dock statute
and the fundamentally unequal distribution of public benefits
that it bestows. The political realities are that waterfront
165. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 995.
166. In 1981, respondent Commissioner Boyle intensified efforts to collect lease
fees for private recreational docks on public tidelands. Enforcement difficulties and
the relatively high cost of administering the program rendered DNR oversight
vulnerable, however, and in 1983, over DNR's objection, a bill sponsored by Bellevueand Mercer Island-area legislators was enacted in the final hours of a long legislative
session. See 1983 WASH. LAWS 2nd Ex. Sess., ch.2, § 2 (formerly SB 3290). That law,
now WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.90.105, set a "dangerous" precedent by sanctioning the
flow of public resource wealth into private hands without a mechanism for
compensating payment. See Hatch, Court's Tideland Ruling Attacked, Seattle Times,
March 11, 1987, G12, col. 4-6.
167. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
168. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 677, 732 P.2d 989, 998 (1987). This
attitude has prevailed in the Washington courts since statehood. See Eisenbach v.
Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891) (discussed at supra note 55).
169. See Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. at 238-39, 26 P. at 540-41.
170. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d at 671-73, 732 P.2d at 995-96.
171. Id., 107 Wash. 2d at 673, 732 P.2d at 996.
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property owners lobbied strongly for Senate Bill 3290, and that
the bill was opposed only by an ineffective and diffuse public
interest. The state Department of Natural Resources did not
effectively pursue collection of recreational dock leasing fees
prior to the offending statute's enactment in 1983, nor, obviously, did it ultimately block passage of the bill before the
legislature.
Under the Sax model, these indicators point to basic lack
of fairness and efficiency in the natural resource allocation
process. Judicial indifference to incremental delegations of
resource wealth indicates a cumulative waste of the public
commons over time; more significantly, it leaves an affected
but under-represented public without recourse in the courts.
In this respect, the Caminiti analysis is squarely at odds with
the contemporary and better authority that any alienation of
trust-protected property requires a strong justification in the
courts. 7 2 Faced with precisely these circumstances, the court
in Caminiti sharpened the dilemma by acknowledging Washington's public trust doctrine only for what it does not
73
1

protect.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Considering the court's recent decision in Caminiti v.
Boyle,'74 whether the public trust doctrine truly has "always
172. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981) ("[A]ny
legislation giving up any such public rights must satisfy a particularly demanding
standard of reasonableness."); Kootnenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht
Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 662, 673, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (1983) ("[T]his court will take a 'close
look' at the action to determine if it complies with the public trust doctrine and it will
not act merely as a rubber stamp for agency or legislative action."); People ex rel.
Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 79, 4 Ill. Dec. 660, 667, 360 N.E.2d 773, 780
(1977) (requiring a "most critical examination" of a legislatively-approved sale of
submerged lands to a private corporation).
173. At this writing, Caminiti is before the court again on petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Together with their reiteration of the constitutional and public trust
issues, petitioners also challenge the original decision by seeking disqualification of
five Justices for potential conflicts of interest.
Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, Caminiti, No. 52459-9 (Wash. S. Ct., filed March 3, 1987). Attached as
exhibits to petitioners' motion are public disclosure statements filed by the Justices
pursuant to the state's Public Disclosure Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17, indicating
their individual ownership of waterfront property. The court's original ruling, and the
conflict of interest contention, caught the attention of the media. See Hatch, Court's
Tideland Ruling Attacked, Seattle Times, March 11, 1987, p. G12, col. 4-6.
174. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987) (discussed supra note
166).
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existed 175 in Washington is a fairly debatable question. As a
property-oriented statement of sovereign responsibility, the
public trust doctrine was implicitly recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in 1891, one year prior to its formal adoption by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central.
As judicial leverage to encourage legislative consideration of a
comprehensive state-wide shoreline management regime, the
public trust doctrine was implicitly invoked in an opinion of
the Washington Supreme Court which pre-dated the Sax public trust model and most of contemporary public trust law in
California, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The doctrine has
spawned shorelines legislation in Washington that also predated its federal counterpart, the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972. As a legislative statement of state aquatic lands
management policy, public trust principles have been expressly
acknowledged.
However, as a means to promote such traditional trust values as shoreline public access and aquatic or coastal resource
conservation in the courts, the public trust doctrine in Washington is still virtually unrecognized. In the final analysis, the
court's observation in Caminiti did nothing to protect public
rights in the state's coastal environment; it confirmed an effectively exclusive right of salt water access by sanctioning the
construction of private recreation docks on public tidelands
without the requirement of compensating payment. Instead of
requiring a more explicit and narrow alienation of the jus publicum by invoking a stricter standard of review in such cases,
the Washington court ignored the contemporary environmental thrust of public trust protection and set a distressingly deferential precedent.
Not surprisingly, public trust issues arise in many real and
tangible controversies and are not merely of academic interest.
The trial court's post-remand decision in Orion, adjusting
downward the developer's due compensation to reflect public
rights of navigation and commerce, could (if upheld) set an
important precedent for the measure of just compensation in
regulatory takings of tideland use rights. Also, procedural protections offer the individual public interest litigant valuable
leverage in administrative and judicial proceedings, where the
burden of persuasion may be relaxed or even reversed under
circumstances indicating a violation of the public trust.
175. Id. at 669-70, 732 P.2d at 994-95.
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At this writing, however, the Washington Supreme Court
appears uninterested in promoting coastal and aquatic resource
conservation under the hard look doctrine. Nevertheless, nondeferential judicial review under the public trust doctrine in
contemporary natural resources law offers the Washington
courts a tie-breaker: leverage with which to require legislative
responsiveness, to force agency compliance with trust-protective statutory mandates, and to encourage negotiation and conciliation through enhanced public involvement in natural
resources decision-making. It demands a consideration of reasonable and acceptable alternatives within the strict tolerances
of the law. Caminiti's recent recognition of the public trust
doctrine offers the Washington courts an opportunity to
assume a vigorous role in challenging and often technical
aquatic and coastal resource allocation practice through the
hard look of judicial review. Considering the trends of history,
neither the doctrine nor its role in contemporary environmental law should be lightly regarded.

